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WHERE’S THE BEEF?: A GUIDE TO JUDGES ON PREEMPTION 
OF STATE TORT  LITIGATION INVOLVING BRANDED DRUGS*  
Victor E. Schwartz**  and Christopher E. Appel***  
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several decisions since 2009 
that clarify the landscape for when a state tort claim against a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer is preempted.1  Generally speaking, 
claimants are permitted to bring lawsuits under state law alleging a 
defect in the design or warnings associated with a branded drug 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but are barred 
from bringing such claims with respect to an FDA-approved generic 
drug.2  The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions in the case of 
branded drugs where a claim may be impliedly preempted, including 
where a pharmaceutical manufacturer shows “clear evidence” that the 
FDA would not have approved a proffered change to the branded 
drug’s warning label.3   
In 2019, the Court in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht4 
added to its preemption jurisprudence by examining what constitutes 
“clear evidence” and how that decision must be made.  The Court 
responded to lower federal and state courts struggling over how to 
apply this language and rendered new, significant guidelines with 
respect to when preemption is an available defense for branded drug 
manufacturers.5  Critically, the Court made explicit that the question 
of whether clear evidence exists that the FDA would not have 
approved a warning change “is a legal one for the judge, not a jury.”6  
 
* This Article is dedicated to the memory of University of Cincinnati College of Law Professor John 
Murphy.  Professor Murphy’s teachings inspired generations of students and his lessons will continue 
with them always. 
** Victor E. Schwartz co-chairs Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Washington, D.C.-based Public Policy 
Group. He coauthors the most widely-used torts casebook in the United States, PROSSER, WADE & 
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS (14th ed. 2020). Mr. Schwartz received his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston 
University and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University. 
*** Christopher E. Appel is an Of Counsel in Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Washington, D.C.-based 
Public Policy Group. He received his B.S. from the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of 
Commerce and his J.D. from Wake Forest University School of Law.   
 1. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011); Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); see 
also infra Part I.A. 
 2. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555; Mensing, 564 U.S. at 604. 
 3. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571. 
 4. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 282 (3d. Cir. 
2017) (stating that “clear evidence” exception created a “cryptic and open-ended” standard for which 
“lower courts have struggled to make it readily administrable”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
 6. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1679. 
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The Court further clarified the legal requirements for a branded drug 
manufacturer to successfully assert such a preemption defense, namely 
that “it fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning 
required by state law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug 
manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s 
label to include that warning.”7 
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Albrecht and new 
issues expected to arise as lower courts interpret it.  The Article’s goal 
is to assist judges and others as to whether a branded drug 
manufacturer has made a sufficient showing, for preemption purposes, 
that the FDA’s action or inaction provides clear evidence that the 
agency would not approve a warning change.  Part I discusses the 
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence regarding pharmaceutical 
products to provide an overview of the legal environment in which 
Albrecht was decided.  It then examines the Albrecht decision.  Part II 
analyzes outstanding issues in the wake of Albrecht and suggests how 
they should be resolved.  It further discusses judges’ required branded 
drug preemption analysis.  Part III examines the role of preemption 
regarding FDA-approved drugs now and in the future.  
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court opened the door in 
Albrecht to potentially broader availability of branded drug 
preemption.  The Court’s decision to vest the authority to make 
preemption determinations in the pharmaceutical context exclusively 
with judges, as well as other statements, reflect the notion that 
preemption should be available where the FDA has directly or 
indirectly rejected a proposed warning change after receiving all of the 
material drug information.  In that regard, and to give full effect to the 
Court’s decision, judges should avoid an overly rigid or inflexible 
approach to preemption determinations regarding branded drugs.  
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT’S KEY PHARMACEUTICAL PREEMPTION 
DECISIONS  
A. Overview of Preemption Landscape  
The U.S. Supreme Court began to clarify the circumstances in which 
tort claims against a pharmaceutical manufacturer are preempted in its 
landmark 2009 ruling in Wyeth v. Levine.8  Wyeth addressed a major 
threshold issue in pharmaceutical litigation of whether a patient’s 
claim that a branded drug contained an inadequate warning under state 
 
 7. Id. at 1678. 
 8. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
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law was preempted where the FDA specifically approved the warning.  
The precise issues involved whether the branded drug manufacturer 
could comply with both the FDA’s labeling requirements and state 
common law warning requirements as determined by a jury, or 
whether these competing requirements presented an “unacceptable 
obstacle” or “impossibility” that impliedly preempted the state claim.9   
The Court held that these types of “conflict preemption” do not 
categorically bar a state failure-to-warn claim because a branded drug 
manufacturer may “unilaterally strengthen its warning,” and therefore 
(at least theoretically) comply with competing federal and state 
requirements, pursuant to an FDA regulation.10  That regulation, called 
the “changes being effected” (CBE) regulation, permits a branded drug 
manufacturer to “add or strengthen” its warning by filing a 
supplemental application with the FDA.11  The Court explained that 
because the branded drug manufacturer “need not wait for FDA 
approval” to proceed in changing its warning pursuant to the CBE 
regulation, it is not impossible for the manufacturer to comply with 
federal law and the potential state law warning requirements as 
determined by juries across fifty states.12  The Court recognized that 
“some state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of 
congressional objectives,” but maintained that “Congress did not 
intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug 
safety and effectiveness.”13 
In reaching this decision, the Court appreciated that “the FDA 
retains authority to reject labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE 
regulation in its review of the manufacturer’s supplemental 
application.”14  The Court explained that a branded drug manufacturer 
could successfully claim it could not comply with both federal and 
state warning requirements in a situation in which there was “clear 
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” in 
warning.15  As discussed in the introduction, this exception is the 
predicate for the Court’s decision in Albrecht.  
In 2011, the Court, in Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing,16 examined preemption 
in the context of FDA-approved generic drugs.  Here, the Court 
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to preemption of a state 
 
 9. Id. at 563, 573 (internal quotation omitted). 
 10. Id. at 560, 573. 
 11. Id. at 568 (quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 575, 581. 
 14. Id. at 571. 
 15. Id.  
 16. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
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failure-to-warn claim, finding federal law created “impossibility” for 
a generic drug manufacturer to unilaterally change its warning to 
comply with potentially different state law requirements.17  
Specifically, the Court stated that pursuant to Congress’s 1984 
enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act, commonly called the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, a generic 
drug’s FDA approval is contingent upon “showing equivalence” with 
an FDA-approved branded drug; a legal requirement for which the 
generic drug manufacturer “is responsible for ensuring that its warning 
label is the same as the brand name’s.”18   
The Court found that this “sameness” requirement applies to any 
warning label changes after the FDA’s initial approval.19  Therefore, 
unlike in Wyeth where the Court determined that the CBE regulation 
enabled a branded drug manufacturer to unilaterally change an FDA-
approved warning, a generic drug manufacturer could not do so under 
the CBE process.  The Court explained that the FDA had likewise 
interpreted its regulations “to require that the warning labels of a 
brand-name drug and its generic copy must always be the same,” and 
that this agency interpretation should be controlling.20   
As the Court further recognized, “generic drug manufacturers have 
different federal drug labeling duties” to promote the separate public 
policy of allowing “manufacturers to develop generic drugs 
inexpensively.”21  The “special, and different, regulation of generic 
drugs” has also proven successful in “bringing more drugs more 
quickly and cheaply to the public” and expanding the generic drug 
market22––a market that in 2018 accounted for around 85% of U.S. 
drug prescriptions.23   
Nevertheless, the Court remained mindful that, from plaintiffs’ 
perspective, a regime generally allowing state failure-to-warn claims 
against branded drug manufacturers and barring state failure-to-warn 
claims against generic drug manufacturers “makes little sense.”24  It 
declined, however, to “distort the Supremacy Clause in order to create 
 
 17. Id. at 618. 
 18. Id. at 612-13. 
 19. Id. at 613.  
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 612-13.  
 22. Id. at 626.  
 23. See Matej Mikulic, Branded vs. Generic U.S. Drug Prescriptions Dispensed 2005-2018, 
STATISTA (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205042/proportion-of-brand-to-generic-
prescriptions-dispensed/; see also Generic Drug Facts, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts (reporting findings of IMS Health Institute 
study that “generic drugs saved the U.S. health care system $1.67 trillion from 2007 to 2016”). 
 24. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625 (2011).  
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similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme[,]” and 
acknowledged that “Congress and the FDA retain the authority to 
change the law and regulations if they so desire.”25 
The Court further illuminated the pharmaceutical preemption 
landscape in 2011 in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC.26  Here, the Court 
determined that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 
which created a no-fault compensation program “to stabilize the 
vaccine market and facilitate compensation” for legitimate vaccine 
injury claims, expressly preempted all design defect claims against 
vaccine manufacturers.27  In doing so, the Court recognized that the 
Act’s vaccine design improvement and compensation provisions 
“reflect[] a sensible choice to leave complex epidemiological 
judgments about vaccine design to the FDA and the National Vaccine 
Program rather than juries.”28 
In 2013, the Court, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. v. Bartlett,29 
addressed preemption for generic drug manufacturers with respect to 
design defect claims.  It determined that the same “impossibility” at 
issue in PLIVA preventing generic drug manufacturers from 
unilaterally changing the FDA-approved warning copied from the 
equivalent branded drug applied to changing the design of an FDA-
approved generic drug.30  The Court explained that the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) “requires a generic drug to have the same 
active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and 
labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is based,” and that 
redesigning the composition of a generic drug would necessarily result 
in a new drug compound that would require a New Drug Application 
(NDA) to be marketed and sold.31  Accordingly, the Court determined 
that a “straightforward application of pre-emption law” bars any 
design defect claim against a generic drug manufacturer.32 
The Court’s precedents establish multiple areas in which state tort 
claims against a pharmaceutical manufacturer are preempted by 
 
 25. Id. at 626.   
 26. 562 U.S. 223 (2011). 
 27. Id. at 228. 
 28. Id. at 239. 
 29. 570 U.S. 472 (2013). 
 30. See id. at 484-86. 
 31. Id. at 483-84. The Court additionally rejected the notion, advanced in a dissenting opinion by 
Justice Sotomayor and in the decision below by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, that a 
generic drug manufacturer could escape the impossibility of complying with both its federal- and state-
law duties by choosing not to make the drug at all.  See id. at 488-89.  As the Court explained, “if the 
option of ceasing to act defeated a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be ‘all but 
meaningless,’” and it would also mean that PLIVA and “the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in 
which the Court has found impossibility pre-emption, were wrongly decided.”  Id.  
 32. Id. at 493.  
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federal law.  Specifically, claims alleging either a design or warning 
defect in an FDA-approved generic drug are preempted, as are any 
product liability claims alleging injury from a vaccine.  Relatedly, the 
Court, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., which was decided in 2008 a year 
before Wyeth, found that claims related to medical devices given 
premarket approval by the FDA are expressly preempted pursuant to 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.33  Only with respect to 
branded drugs that comprise around 10% of U.S. drug prescriptions is 
a preemption defense generally not available to the manufacturer.34  It 
is against this backdrop that the Court decided Albrecht. 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the Law Regarding Branded Drug 
Preemption 
Albrecht involved claims by more than 500 individuals who took 
the branded drug Fosamax, which is approved by the FDA to treat and 
prevent osteoporosis in postmenopausal women.35  They alleged 
Fosamax’s FDA-approved warning label before 2011 was defective in 
failing to adequately warn of the drug’s risk of injury from “atypical 
femoral fractures” (i.e. fractures of the femur bone).36  Fosamax’s 
manufacturer, Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. (Merck), defended the 
failure-to-warn claims, which were brought under the law of multiple 
states and consolidated in a multi-district litigation (MDL) action, on 
the basis that the FDA considered and rejected efforts by Merck to add 
a specific warning about Fosamax’s risk of causing bone “stress 
fractures.”37  This rejection, Merck argued, provided “clear evidence” 
the FDA would not approve a warning change, entitling the company 
to a preemption defense under the exception set forth in Wyeth.   
Fosamax was approved by the FDA in 1995 without a warning 
referencing a risk of bone fractures.38  As far back as 1990, when 
Fosamax was undergoing preapproval clinical trials, Merck’s 
scientists expressed concern that Fosamax could at least theoretically 
inhibit bone remodeling, which is the process through which bones are 
continuously broken down and built back up again, to a degree that 
would cause bone fractures.39  Merck brought these concerns to the 
FDA’s attention when the company applied for approval of Fosamax, 
 
 33. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 34. See Mikulic, supra note 23.  
 35. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673-75 (2019).  
 36. Id. at 1674.   
 37. Id. at 1668, 1675. 
 38. Id. at 1674. 
 39. Id.  
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but the FDA, “perhaps because the concerns were only theoretical,” 
approved Fosamax’s warning label without requiring any mention of 
this risk.40 
In the decade following Fosamax’s approval, Merck began 
receiving adverse event reports from the medical community 
indicating that individuals who had taken Fosamax for more than five 
years were suffering atypical femoral fractures.41  Merck and others in 
the medical community began analyzing this adverse event data and 
additional case studies and scholarship examining possible 
connections between long-term Fosamax use and bone fractures.42  By 
2008, Merck believed there was sufficient evidence to support 
additional warnings for prescribing physicians, and applied to the FDA 
for preapproval to change Fosamax’s label.43  Merck did so by 
submitting Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) applications to the 
agency which presented data, analyses and other information to 
support proposed labeling changes.44 
Specifically, Merck proposed including in the “Precautions” section 
of Fosamax’s label, under the heading “Low-Energy Femoral Shaft 
Fracture,” a discussion of reported bone stress fractures occurring in 
the absence of trauma.45  Merck additionally proposed referencing the 
potential for “low-energy femoral shaft fracture” in the “Adverse 
Reactions” section of Fosamax’s label.46  The FDA approved the 
addition to the Adverse Reactions section, but rejected Merck’s 
proposed change to the Precautions section.47  The agency explained 
that the proposed change to the Precautions section lacked adequate 
justification in the relevant medical literature.48    
Merck subsequently resolved in 2008 to effectuate changes to 
Fosamax’s label through the CBE process.  It adopted the proposed 
changes to the Adverse Reactions section with which the FDA 
expressed agreement, but did not adopt the proposed changes to the 
Precautions section with which the FDA expressed disagreement.49  
Such agency disagreement also continued for several additional years.  
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See id.  
 43. See id. 
 44. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (discussing Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) criteria).  
 45. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-08(JAP)(LHG), 2014 WL 
1266994, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1668 
(2019). 
 46. Id.; Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674.   
 47. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674.   
 48. Id.; see also In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d at 277. 
 49. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674. 
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For instance, in 2010, the FDA issued a Drug Safety Communication 
in which it stated that “[a]t this point, the data that FDA has reviewed 
have not shown a clear connection between bisphosphonate [Fosamax] 
use and a risk of atypical subtrochanteric femur fractures.”50  The FDA 
stated, however, that it was “working closely with outside experts, 
including members of the . . . American Society of Bone and Mineral 
Research Subtrochanteric Femoral Fracture Task Force, to gather 
additional information that may provide more insight.”51 
In 2011, the FDA ordered a change to Fosamax’s label based on its 
own analysis, notwithstanding the agency’s continued doubts about 
the existence of a causal relationship between the drug and potential 
injury.52  Merck again proposed warning language referencing bone 
“stress fractures,” but the FDA decided to expressly reference 
“[a]typical”, “low-energy”, or low trauma fractures of the femoral 
shaft to communicate the “seriousness” of the type of injury that could 
result.53  Merck and the FDA ultimately agreed to add a brief, 
approximately 200-word discussion of atypical femoral fractures to the 
Warnings and Precautions section of Fosamax’s more than 12,000-
word label (totaling 23 pages of physician prescribing and warning 
information).54  
Individuals who took Fosamax between 1999 and 2010 sued Merck 
for failing to warn about a risk of atypical femoral fractures.  The MDL 
court rejected this argument, finding the claims preempted.55  It 
explained that the “evidence surrounding whether the FDA felt that a 
label change was necessary . . . provides clear evidence that the FDA 
would have rejected a stronger Precautions warning because the FDA 
 
 50. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., 2014 WL 1266994, at *4 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1675; In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 
F.3d 268, 278 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019) (stating that FDA “reiterated that it was 
still ‘not clear if bisphosphonates are the cause’” of atypical unusual femur fractures in the agency’s 
October 2010 announcement of a pending warning label change).   
 53. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (internal citations omitted).  
 54. Id..; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REF. ID 3083184, FOSAMAX FULL PROSCRIBING INFORMATION  
(Feb. 2012),  available at 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/021575s017lbl.pdf.. As the Court explained 
in Albrecht: 
Although we commonly understand a drug's “label” to refer to the sticker affixed to a prescription 
bottle, in this context the term refers more broadly to the written material that is sent to the 
physician who prescribes the drug and the written material that comes with the prescription bottle 
when the drug is handed to the patient at the pharmacy . . . . These (often lengthy) package inserts 
contain detailed information about the drug's medical uses and health risks.  
139 S. Ct. at 1672-73 (internal citations omitted). 
 55. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., 2014 WL 1266994, at *16. 
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did reject a stronger Precautions warning.”56  The court further 
determined that had Merck used the CBE process to unilaterally adopt 
its proposed warning about bones stress fractures––again in a proposed 
section titled “Low-Energy Femoral Shaft Fracture”––the company 
would have been subject to liability for misbranding.57   
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the 
preemption ruling of the MDL court, making several, ultimately 
incorrect interpretations of Wyeth’s “clear evidence” exception along 
the way.58  First, the court determined that “the term ‘clear evidence’ 
refers solely to the applicable standard of proof,” which requires the 
branded drug manufacturer to “prove that it is highly probable that the 
FDA would not have approved a change to the drug’s label.”59  Second, 
the court determined that “the ultimate question of whether the FDA 
would have rejected a label change is a question of fact for the jury 
rather than for the court.”60  Therefore, the court concluded it could 
only affirm the decision of the MDL court upon a finding that “no 
reasonable juror could conclude that it is anything less than highly 
probable that the FDA would have rejected Plaintiff’s proposed 
atypical-fracture warning had Merck proposed it to the FDA.”61   
In articulating this “demanding and fact-sensitive” standard, the 
court acknowledged that juries would need to perform a preemption 
“assessment [that] is certainly complex.”62  It argued, however, that 
requiring a jury to evaluate and make inferences regarding 
“correspondence, agency statements, contemporaneous medical 
literature, the requirements of the CBE regulation, and whatever 
intuitions the factfinder may have about administrative inertia and 
agency decision-making processes” involves an assessment “little 
different from the type of fact questions that are routinely given to a 
jury.”63  The court also asserted that this complex assessment “does 
not require any special legal competence or training.”64  It further 
opined that having juries determine whether a branded drug 
manufacturer satisfies such a standard in light of the FDA’s regulatory 
framework “will not drastically change how defendants will litigate 
 
 56. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 57. Id. at *3-4, *16.  
 58. See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 268 (3d Cir. 2017), 
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).   
 59. Id. at 282, 295 (emphasis added).  
 60. Id. at 282.   
 61. Id. at 295.   
 62. Id. at 271, 293.   
 63. Id. at 293, 289.   
 64. Id. 293. 
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the preemption defense.”65 
The U.S. Supreme Court took the opportunity in accepting review 
in Albrecht to clear up some misconceptions, by the Third Circuit and 
other lower courts, about the “clear evidence” exception.  First, the 
Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Breyer, explained 
that the exception was never intended to set forth a heightened 
evidentiary standard, or any evidentiary standard, for pharmaceutical 
preemption determinations.66  Rather, the Court’s reference to “clear 
evidence” in Wyeth simply described a need for clarity regarding 
“whatever the means the FDA uses to exercise its authority” in 
communicating disapproval of a proposed change to a drug’s 
warning.67  Second, and relatedly, the Court stated that the 
“complexity” inherent to the “nature and scope” of the FDA’s 
determinations, including the alleged disapproval of a proposed 
warning change, means “the question is a legal one for the judge, not 
a jury.”68   
As the Court explained, “judges are better suited than are juries to 
understand and to interpret agency decisions in light of the governing 
statutory and regulatory context.”69  “Judges,” the Court continued, 
“are experienced in ‘[t]he construction of written instruments,’ such as 
those normally produced by a federal agency to memorialize its 
considered judgments,” and “are normally familiar with principles of 
administrative law.”70  The Court also reasoned that placing 
pharmaceutical preemption determinations exclusively with judges 
“should produce greater uniformity among courts; and greater 
uniformity is normally a virtue when a question requires a 
determination concerning the scope and effect of federal agency 
action.”71  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the “’better 
positioned’ decisionmaker is the judge” with respect to whether the 
“clear evidence” exception is satisfied.72 
The Court additionally clarified judges’ required preemption 
analysis regarding the existence of “clear evidence.”  The Court stated 
that “’clear evidence’ is evidence that shows the court that the drug 
manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the 
warning required by state law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the 
 
 65. Id. at 294. 
 66. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1679-80.  
 69. Id. at 1680.  
 70. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to the 
drug’s label to include that warning.”73  The Court recognized that 
federal law permits the FDA to communicate its disapproval of a 
warning in a variety of ways, including notice-and-comment 
rulemaking setting forth labeling standards, formally rejecting a 
warning label that would have been adequate under state law, or other 
agency action carrying the force of law.74  The Court also made clear 
that the question of the FDA’s “disapproval ‘method’” was not before 
the Court, stating only that the “means must lie within the scope of the 
authority Congress has lawfully delegated.”75  It explained further that 
“the judge must simply ask himself or herself whether the relevant 
federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflic[t]’” in reviewing 
whatever “method” the FDA expressed disapproval.76 
Two concurring opinions offered widely divergent views on how 
lower courts might apply the “clear evidence” exception.  Justice 
Thomas authored a concurring opinion endorsing a narrow view of 
what expressions of FDA disapproval of a warning change would be 
sufficient to demonstrate impossibility and preempt a state failure-to-
warn claim against the branded drug manufacturer.77  He dismissed the 
basic notion that the “FDA would have rejected a hypothetical labeling 
change submitted via the CBE process” because “neither agency 
musings nor hypothetical future rejections constitute pre-emptive 
‘Laws’ under the Supremacy Clause.”78  In his view, preemption could 
only be obtainable where the FDA has issued a final ruling rejecting a 
manufacturer’s application to change a warning or has issued a 
supplemental ruling formally rejecting a warning change made 
unilaterally by the manufacturer pursuant to the CBE process.79  
Because Merck withdrew its preapproval applications to implement a 
warning change via the CBE process––a responsive action to the 
FDA’s expressed disapproval––and did not include in the CBE 
application the proposed changes to Fosamax’s “Precautions” section 
for which the FDA expressed disapproval, Justice Thomas concluded 
there had been no final agency action precluding Merck’s compliance 
with federal and state law requirements.80   
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice 
 
 73. Id. at 1672.  
 74. Id. at 1679.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)). 
 77. See id. at 1681-83 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 78. Id. at 1682.  
 79. See id. at 1682-83.  
 80. See id.  
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Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, advanced a more pragmatic approach 
to whether a branded drug manufacturer can successfully claim 
preemption under the “clear evidence” exception.81  He emphasized 
the “real world” nature of a branded drug manufacturer’s dealings with 
the FDA, whereby “if the FDA declines to require a label change 
despite having received and considered information regarding a new 
risk, the logical conclusion is that the FDA determined that a label 
change was unjustified.”82  Justice Alito was especially troubled by 
what he felt was a “one-sided account” by the majority of the Court of 
the case facts which downplayed the “extensive communication 
between Merck and the FDA during the relevant period.”83 
In particular, Justice Alito detailed multiple communications 
between the FDA and Merck in which the agency expressed its 
disapproval of a proposed change to Fosamax’s warning.  These 
communications included a phone conversation in 2008, while 
Merck’s application to change Fosamax’s label was pending, in which 
an FDA official purportedly told Merck that “[t]he conflicting nature 
of the literature does not provide a clear path forward, and more time 
will be need[ed] for FDA to formulate a formal opinion on the issue of 
a precaution around these data.”84  They also included an email from 
another FDA official about a week later stating “the FDA would ‘close 
out’ Merck’s applications if Merck ‘agree[d] to hold off on the 
[Precautions] language at this time.’”85  That communication further 
indicated that the FDA “would then work with . . . Merck to decide on 
language for a [Precautions] atypical fracture language, if it is 
warranted.”86   
Such communications, combined with the FDA’s Safety 
Announcement issued months later stating that the agency reviewed 
the data and found no “clear connection” to a risk of atypical femoral 
fractures, supported the “logical conclusion” that the FDA would not 
have approved a change in warning.87  Justice Alito also found it telling 
that “the Safety Announcement concluded by admonishing healthcare 
professionals to ‘continue to follow the recommendations in the drug 
label when prescribing oral bisphosphonates’ [e.g., Fosamax] and 
patients to ‘not stop taking their medication unless told to do so by 
 
 81. See id. at 1684-86 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 82. Id. at 1684.  
 83. Id. at 1685.  
 84. Id. (quoting internal Merck memorandum describing call provided as part of case record).   
 85. Id. at 1685-86 (quoting case record).   
 86. Id. at 1686 (quoting case record).   
 87. Id. (quoting FDA Safety Announcement).    
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their healthcare professional.’”88  He additionally noted that “the FDA 
itself, speaking through the Solicitor General, takes the position that 
the FDA’s decision not to require a label change prior to October 2010 
reflected the FDA’s ‘determin[ation]’ that a new warning ‘should [not] 
be included in the labeling of the drug.’”89   
Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts concluded that 
failure-to-warn claims against Merck should be preempted because 
“for years the FDA was: aware of this [warning] issue, communicating 
with drug manufacturers, studying all relevant information, and 
instructing healthcare professionals and patients alike to continue to 
use Fosamax as directed.”90  These “extensive” communications by the 
FDA provided “clear evidence” that the FDA would not approve a 
change in Fosamax’s warning; an agency determination that warranted 
preemptive effect under Wyeth.91   
II. NAVIGATING THE CONTOURS OF BRANDED DRUG PREEMPTION TODAY 
Although the Supreme Court’s primary holding in Albrecht—that 
judges, not juries, must make pharmaceutical preemption 
determinations—is fairly straightforward, there are a number of 
outstanding issues that will likely play out in lower courts in the wake 
of the decision.  The Court even acknowledged that it accepted review 
of Albrecht in light of “differences and uncertainties among the courts 
of appeals and state supreme courts in respect to the application of 
Wyeth” and the “clear evidence” exception, and that the Court’s 
decision to remand the case centered on the “determinative question” 
of the required decisionmaker without articulating precisely what will, 
and will not, satisfy the “clear evidence” exception.92  Nevertheless, 
the Court did “elaborate Wyeth’s requirements along the way” to help 
guide judges in their preemption analysis.93 
A. Pragmatism Should Govern Whether the “Clear Evidence” 
Exception Is Satisfied 
The most important outstanding issue following Albrecht is what 
communication, action, or inaction by the FDA is sufficient to satisfy the 
“clear evidence” exception.  As indicated in Part I, members of the Court 
 
 88. Id. (quoting FDA Safety Announcement).    
 89. Id. (quoting Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae).    
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 1685.    
 92. Id. at 1676, 1679 (majority opinion).    
 93. Id. at 1676. 
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had differing opinions on this issue.  Justice Thomas supported the 
requirement of a formal FDA ruling explicitly rejecting a proposed 
warning change, leaving no doubts whatsoever, while Justices Alito, 
Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts supported a more flexible approach 
that considers the full scope of the branded drug manufacturer’s 
interactions and communications with the FDA.94 
The majority of the Court expressed the “clear evidence” exception as 
requiring “evidence that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully 
informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state 
law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the 
FDA would not approve a change to the drug’s label to include that 
warning.”95  This formulation, similar to that of Justices Alito, 
Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts, focuses on the exchange of 
information between the FDA and branded drug manufacturer.  It omits 
an express requirement of a formal agency ruling rejecting a 
manufacturer’s preapproval application to change a warning or 
subsequent rejection of a manufacturer’s unilateral warning change made 
pursuant to the CBE process.  In this regard, the Court appeared to adopt 
a more practical or functional approach to whether the FDA’s 
communications signal disapproval of a proposed warning change.  
Such a practical approach is also more consistent with the Court’s 
primary holding to vest the preemption analysis exclusively with judges 
who “are better equipped to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s 
determination.”96  Indeed, if the Court intended that the FDA needed to 
make a formal ruling rejecting a proposed warning change or a warning 
change effectuated by the manufacturer pursuant to the CBE process in 
every circumstance, there would be little need for a preemption analysis.  
Rather, by adopting the “fully informed” and “informed” terminology that 
underscores the information exchange between the branded drug 
manufacturer and the FDA as the standard for the “clear evidence” 
exception, the Court appeared to envision a broader set of circumstances 
in which the FDA’s communications would carry a preemptive effect.97  
The Court appeared to task judges with the preemption analysis precisely 
because the answer may not always be “clear cut,” and “judges are better 
suited than are juries to understand and to interpret agency decisions.”98 
This practical approach additionally makes greater sense from a public 
policy standpoint.  If a branded drug manufacturer believes a change in a 
drug’s warning is warranted, it has two options: 1) seek the FDA’s 
 
 94. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.   
 95. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1672 (emphasis added).  
 96. Id. at 1680 (emphasis added).  
 97. Id. at 1672.  
 98. Id. at 1680.  
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preapproval of a change to the drug’s existing approved warning by 
submitting a PAS application; or 2) effectuate the change through the 
CBE process.99  As discussed, Merck utilized both paths by first 
submitting PAS applications, which resulted in the FDA communicating 
its approval of a proposed change to Fosamax’s “Adverse Reactions” 
section (but not to the drug’s “Precautions” section), before using the 
CBE process to ultimately effectuate the change to the “Adverse 
Reactions” section.100  If Merck, to obtain preemption, was required to 
have included in its CBE application the changes to Fosamax’s 
“Precautions” section for which the FDA consistently communicated its 
disapproval and then await a formal, subsequent rejection by the FDA of 
that warning change, the result would have been a series of inconsistent 
warnings to prescribing physicians.   
It is not difficult to imagine how problematic and disruptive such a 
requirement would be.  Risk-adverse branded drug manufacturers unsure 
about a potential need for an added warning would have an incentive to 
pursue warning changes more readily through the CBE process just so the 
FDA formally repudiates the warning change after it has been made, 
which would establish a clear basis to preempt failure-to-warn claims.  As 
a result, branded drug warnings could experience increased volatility 
through back-and-forth labeling changes introduced by the manufacturer 
and rejected by the FDA, creating confusion for prescribing physicians 
and impeding patient safety.101   
The FDA also appears to share this concern.  In its brief in Albrecht, 
the agency, speaking through the Solicitor General, indicated that the 
FDA has historically “accepted PAS applications instead of CBE 
supplements . . . particularly where significant questions exist on whether 
to revise or how to modify existing drug labeling.”102  The agency’s 
“Guidance for Industry” on safety labeling changes also states that 
warning changes based on new safety information made pursuant to the 
CBE process should be reserved for situations in which the 
manufacturer’s proposed changes are “identical” to those for which the 
FDA has communicated approval.103  “In all other situations,” the FDA 
 
 99. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b), (c) (2020); see also Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 85 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020) (“Two avenues exist for manufacturers to update their drug labels.”). 
 100. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.  
 101. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1673 (stating objective of FDA regulations to “exclude 
‘[e]xaggeration of risk, or inclusion of speculative or hypothetical risks,’ that ‘could discourage 
appropriate use of a beneficial drug’” (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes 
for Approved Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices,73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2851 (Jan. 16, 2008))); see also infra 
notes 143-150 and accompanying text. 
 102. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of United States as Amicus 
Curiae).  
 103. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ASS’N, CONTROL NO. 0910-0734, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY 
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has explained, the branded drug manufacturer should submit a PAS 
application to “propose alternative labeling changes that reflect the new 
safety information.”104  The public policy objective here is to promote 
collaboration between the FDA and the branded drug manufacturer to 
build “consensus on wording of the labeling change,” not encourage the 
manufacturer to rely on the CBE process as a tool to force the FDA’s hand 
into removing all doubts about the agency’s position for the purpose of a 
“clear evidence” preemption analysis.105 
Requiring a formal FDA rejection of a branded drug manufacturer’s 
warning change effectuated through the CBE process would also prove 
needlessly inefficient and wasteful where the FDA has made its position 
known in its response to a manufacturer’s PAS application (which was 
the case with Merck in Albrecht).  The CBE process involves a 
significant, costly undertaking for a branded drug manufacturer that 
additionally stretches the FDA’s limited resources.  It is intended to be 
used “sparingly.”106  Pursuant to the CBE process, a branded drug 
manufacturer endeavoring to “add or strengthen” a drug’s labeling must 
prepare “a full explanation of the basis for the change” to reflect “newly 
acquired information.”107  The newly acquired information must include 
data, analyses, or other information that provide “reasonable evidence of 
a causal association” of a “clinically significant adverse reaction[]” to a 
drug;108 onerous requirements designed to protect against misuse or 
overuse of the CBE process.109  At the very least, such an undertaking 
may be needlessly duplicative of a PAS application, which among other 
 
LABELING CHANGES – IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE FD&C ACT,  7 (2013), available 
at https://www.fda.gov/media/116594/download. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added).  
 105. Id. at 11.  
 106. McGrath v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 161, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he 
FDA contemplated that the CBE regulation would be used sparingly, noting it ‘would not allow a change 
to labeling to add a warning in the absence of reasonable evidence of an association between the product 
and an adverse event.’”) (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 2851)).  
 107. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii). “Newly acquired information is data, analyses, or other 
information not previously submitted to the Agency, which may include (but is not limited to) data derived 
from clinical studies, reports of adverse events, or new analyses of previously submitted data (e.g., meta-
analyses) if the studies, events, or analyses reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency 
than previously included in submissions to the FDA.”  21 C.F.R. § 314.3. 
 108. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i); see also Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 644, 
659 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(“[T]he CBE regulation requires that there be sufficient evidence of a causal association between the drug 
and the information sought to be added.”). 
 109. See Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (2019) (stating these 
requirements are meant to “exclude [e]xaggeration of risk, or inclusion of speculative or hypothetical 
risks,’ that ‘could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug’”) (quoting Supplemental Applications 
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices,73 Fed. Reg. at 2851)); see 
also infra Part II.B (discussing CBE regulation).  
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things similarly requires the branded drug manufacturer to package a 
“detailed description of the proposed change,” a “description of the 
methods used and studies performed to assess the effects of the change” 
and the “data derived from such studies.”110 
Even before Albrecht was decided, courts recognized that the “plain 
language” of Wyeth does not support the “contention that manufacturer 
submission and express rejection of a proposed warning is required to 
satisfy the clear evidence standard.”111  Rather, the “relevant inquiry in 
each conflict preemption case since [Wyeth v.] Levine is stated as whether 
the FDA would have rejected a proposed labeling change, not whether the 
FDA did in fact issue an explicit rejection.”112 Wyeth’s clear evidence 
exception, therefore, “necessarily considers instances where a 
manufacturer has not submitted a labeling change to the FDA.”113  
Early judicial interpretations of Albrecht suggest a pragmatic approach 
that examines the totality of the communications between the FDA and 
branded drug manufacturer, and does not require a formal or explicit FDA 
rejection, is becoming more deeply entrenched.  For example, in 2020, a 
federal district court in Missouri determined that failure-to-warn claims 
against the manufacturer of the branded blood thinner Pradaxa, which was 
approved by the FDA in 2010 to reduce the risk of stroke and blood clots 
in patients with atrial fibrillation, were preempted pursuant to the “clear 
evidence” exception.114  Here, plaintiffs sued the manufacturer for 
allegedly failing to add stronger warnings about the risk of bleeding.115  
The court found the claims preempted not based on any specific action by 
the FDA, but rather “in light of the known issues and the ongoing give-
and-take between [the branded drug manufacturer] and the FDA on these 
issues.”116 
 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that several studies of Pradaxa after 
it obtained FDA approval and a more detailed label for the drug’s sale in 
the European Union constituted “newly acquired information” requiring 
 
 110. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3).  
 111. See Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1169 (S.D. Cal. 2016); see 
also Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213-16 (D. Utah 2016) (“Courts have universally 
rejected the notion that Levine requires a showing that the manufacturer attempted to apply the warning 
suggested by the plaintiff but that the labeling was ultimately rejected by the FDA.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 855 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 112. Seufert, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (emphasis added).  
 113. Id. at 1170; see also id. (“Courts in this Circuit and others have considered several factors in 
assessing conflict preemption, including the regulatory history of the drug or drug class at issue, temporal 
gaps between FDA action and accrual of a plaintiff’s claims, citizen petition submissions and rejections, 
available scientific data, and whether the FDA has reviewed the particular harm at issue and the 
consistency of any resulting conclusions.”). 
 114. Ridings v. Maurice, 444 F. Supp. 3d 973, 981-83, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2020). 
 115. See id. at 988.  
 116. Id.  
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the manufacturer to add stronger U.S. warnings pursuant to the CBE 
process.117  The court determined that this information, while helpful, did 
not provide conclusive new safety information because the FDA had 
always “understood that the use of Pradaxa presented a trade-off between 
an increased risk of stroke and an increased risk of major bleeding” based 
on different dosages.118  The court went further, though, in stating that 
even if the information cited by the plaintiffs constituted “newly acquired 
information,” the branded drug manufacturer “offered sufficient ‘clear 
evidence’ that the FDA . . . nonetheless would have rejected the 
warning(s).”119   
The court explained that the FDA had contemporaneously reviewed the 
studies cited by the plaintiff, as well as other information provided to the 
agency by the branded drug manufacturer, and consistently declined to 
pursue additional warnings.120  In light of this ongoing study and 
cooperation with the branded drug manufacturer, the court held that “the 
FDA’s continued inaction does represent clear evidence.”121   
A federal district court in Louisiana reached a similar conclusion in 
another case decided within a year of Albrecht.122  The plaintiff alleged 
various tort claims, including failure-to-warn, against the manufacturer of 
the branded drug MultiHance, a Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agent 
(GBCA) approved by the FDA in 2004 for intravenuous injection to 
create clearer, sharper images in MRI and MRA scans.123  The plaintiff, 
who experienced an adverse reaction after being injected with the drug, 
argued that a specific warning about potential health risks of “gadolinium 
retention” was required by the manufacturer.124  The court rejected this 
argument based on the absence of purported new safety risk information 
requiring the branded drug manufacturer to change the warning, and 
“more importantly” because there was “clear evidence that the FDA 
would not have approved a warning about the alleged adverse health 
consequences of a GBCA injection.”125  
The court reached this conclusion not based on any FDA rejection of a 
PAS application or CBE supplement by the branded drug manufacturer, 
 
 117. See id. at 993-94.  
 118. Id. at 993.  
 119. Id. at 998.  
 120. See id. at 993-98.  
 121. Id. at 998 (emphasis added).  The court cautioned, however, that “it should not always be the 
case that simple inaction by the FDA in light of submitted data will always be ‘clear evidence’ that the 
FDA would reject a particular warning.”  Id.  
 122. See Thomas v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00493, 2020 WL 1016273 (W.D. La. 
Feb. 27, 2020). 
 123. See id. at *1. 
 124. See id. at *1, *6-8. 
 125. Id. at *10. 
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but rather based on independent action by the agency.  The FDA approved 
a revised warning in 2018, about a month before the plaintiff’s injection, 
which specifically addressed the presence of gadolinium retention in the 
body.126  The added warning, however, stated that “clinical 
consequences” of gadolinium retention had not been established.127  
Because the “FDA had actually issued a revised warning informing the 
medical community that retention occurred but specifically adding that 
no causal relationship . . . has been established,” the court determined that 
there was “clear evidence” the FDA would not have approved a proffered 
labeling change specifying health risks of gadolinium retention.128 
Courts have also found that the FDA’s denial of a citizen petition to 
change a branded drug’s warning may be sufficient to establish “clear 
evidence” that the agency would not approve a labeling change.  As the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained, there is “nothing 
in Wyeth or Albrecht excluding [a branded drug manufacturer] from 
justifying preemption” where the FDA has rejected a petition by an entity 
that is not the manufacturer.129  Similarly, a North Dakota trial court stated 
that it would be “nonsensical” to interpret Albrecht “so narrowly” as to 
ignore the FDA’s denial of a citizen petition in applying the “clear 
evidence” exception because “[r]egardless of who submitted the proposed 
warning or labeling change, the FDA has already decided that the relevant 
evidence and policies do not meet the standard to justify a change.”130   
Such applications of the “clear evidence” exception following Albrecht 
underscore the importance of an approach with flexibility to account for 
the many ways modifications of branded drug warning labels occur in 
practice.  “Clear evidence,” as the Supreme Court explained, must not be 
confused in this context with a heightened evidentiary burden or an 
explicit showing that removes all doubt about whether a branded drug 
manufacturer can comply with federal and state requirements.131  The 
Court’s refined standard avoided rigid or formalistic requirements to 
focus the analysis on the information exchange with the FDA, namely 
whether the agency was “fully informed” and in turn “informed” the 
branded drug manufacturer of agency determinations.132  This 
 
 126. See id. at *6, *10. 
 127. Id. at *6. 
 128. Id. at *10; see also Drescher v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc., No. CV-19-00096-TUC-RM (LCK), 
2020 WL 699878, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2020) (stating that although the FDA ultimately required a label 
change for GBCAs in 2018, “that label explicitly refutes a causal association”).  
 129. Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 783 Fed. Appx. 804, 808 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal 
of plaintiffs’ state law failure-to-warn, fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims).  
 130. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 08-2018-CV-01300, 2019 WL 3776653, at *2 (N.D. Dist. 
Ct. July 22, 2019). 
 131. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019). 
 132. Id. at 1678. 
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information contemplates “extensive communication” and an “ongoing 
give-and-take” between the branded drug manufacturer and the agency 
regardless of whether a warning change is ultimately effectuated by the 
FDA approving a manufacturer’s PAS application, approving or rejecting 
a manufacturer’s change made pursuant to the CBE process, or by the 
agency acting on its own to adopt a warning change.133  It may also 
include a negative inference in approved warning information as seen 
with the GBCA MultiHance or the FDA’s denial of a third party’s citizen 
petition to effectuate a warning change.  Courts applying the “clear 
evidence” exception should approach the preemption analysis with the 
understanding that the exception is designed for function over form, and 
that in the complex area of pharmaceutical regulation, FDA 
communications, action, and inaction can demonstrate “clear evidence” 
that the agency would not adopt a proffered warning change.  
B. Conducting a Branded Drug Preemption Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s effort in Albrecht to “elaborate” the “clear 
evidence” exception raises the issue of how judges charged with a 
branded drug preemption analysis are meant to fulfill that 
responsibility.  As discussed in the previous section, approaching this 
responsibility with a sense of pragmatism and willingness to consider 
the totality of the circumstances and information exchange between 
the FDA and branded drug manufacturer is a key first step.  But what 
are each of the steps in a branded drug preemption analysis today? 
Courts deciding whether a failure-to-warn claim against a branded 
drug manufacturer is preempted often break down the analysis into two 
parts.134  The first part examines whether the path identified in Wyeth 
in which the branded drug manufacturer may unilaterally change an 
FDA-approved warning––i.e. the CBE process––is even available to 
the manufacturer.135  If the CBE process is not available, the rationale 
set forth in Wyeth for allowing a claim against a branded drug 
manufacturer fails, meaning the claim should be preempted because 
the manufacturer cannot legally change a warning without FDA 
approval.  
Although the Court in Wyeth may have created an impression that a 
 
 133. Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring); Ridings v. Maurice, 444 F. Supp. 3d 973, 998 (W.D. Mo. 
2020). 
 134. See, e.g., Adkins v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. X03HHDCV1606065131S, 2020 
WL 1890681, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020) (discussing “two-pronged” nature of preemption 
analysis); Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 87 (S.D. N.Y. 2020) (discussing plaintiffs’ failure to 
satisfy “first step” of preemption analysis).  
 135. Adkins, 2020 WL 1890681, at *4 (stating that Albrecht maintained “the first, CBE prong of 
the preemption test”).  
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branded drug manufacturer is generally free to unilaterally change a 
warning if and when it sees fit, FDA regulations make plain that the 
circumstances are limited.136  As mentioned previously with respect to 
the burdens associated with the CBE process, a branded drug 
manufacturer can only pursue a warning change through the CBE 
process in light of “newly acquired information.”137  Newly acquired 
information is defined as “data, analyses, or other information not 
previously submitted to the [FDA],” which means a branded drug 
manufacturer’s unilateral warning change cannot be predicated on 
information the manufacturer has already supplied the agency in 
obtaining initial approval of a branded drug’s warning or a subsequent 
approval or rejection of a revised warning.138  Newly acquired 
information may include “data derived from new clinical studies, 
reports of adverse events, or new analyses of previously submitted data 
(e.g., meta-analyses) if the studies, events, or analyses reveal risks of 
a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously 
included in submissions to FDA.”139   
In addition, the newly acquired information must provide 
“reasonable evidence of a causal association” of a “clinically 
significant adverse reaction[]” to a drug.140  A clinically significant 
adverse reaction includes reactions that have a “significant impact on 
therapeutic decision-making,” such as a risk that is “potentially fatal” 
or “serious even if infrequent.”141  Therefore, new data or analyses that 
evaluate adverse events or other impacts of a branded drug, but do not 
 
 136. See MacMurray v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00195, 2017 WL 
11496825, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 17, 2017) (“The CBE regulation is restrictive . . . . Labeling changes 
pursuant to the CBE regulation may only be made on the basis of ‘newly acquired information.’”). 
 137. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii) (2016).  
 138. 21 C.F.R. § 314:3(b) (2016); see also Roberto v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. 
CPLHHDCV166068484S, 2019 WL 5068452, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2019) (“[A]ny claim 
that a drug label should be changed based solely on ‘information previously submitted to the FDA is 
preempted because the CBE regulation cannot be used to make a label change based on such 
information.’”) (quoting In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 185 
F. Supp. 3d 761, 769 (D.S.C. 2016)). 
 139. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2016) (emphasis added). The newly acquired information must also 
accomplish one of five statutory objectives, including a change to: 1) “add or strengthen a 
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction”; 2) “add or strengthen a statement about drug 
abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage”; 3) “add or strengthen an instruction about 
dosage and administration”; 4) “delete false, misleading, or unsupported indications for use or claims for 
effectiveness”; and 5) “Any labeling change normally requiring a supplement submission and approval 
prior to distribution of the drug product that FDA specifically requests be submitted under this provision.” 
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2016). 
 140. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2015); see also Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 
387, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is technically a violation of federal law to propose a CBE that is not based 
on reasonable evidence.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 141. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and 
Biological Products,71 Fed. Reg. 3922-01, 3946 (Jan. 24, 2006); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2015). 
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expressly identify a causal association to a clinically significant 
adverse reaction, are irrelevant to a preemption analysis because they 
offer no actionable intelligence that would enable the manufacturer to 
pursue a warning change pursuant to the CBE process.142 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Albrecht, the limitations set 
forth in the CBE process serve to “exclude ‘[e]xaggeration of risk, or 
inclusion of speculative or hypothetical risks,’ that ‘could discourage 
appropriate use of a beneficial drug.’”143  A plaintiff pursuing a failure-
to-warn claim against a branded drug manufacturer thus bears the 
initial burden of demonstrating the existence of newly acquired 
information for which the manufacturer failed to act upon by pursuing 
a unilateral warning change through the CBE process.144 
A number of branded drug preemption cases decided in the wake of 
Albrecht have turned on the sufficiency of purported newly acquired 
information.  For example, in 2020, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York rejected failure-to-warn claims involving 
the FDA-approved cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.145  Plaintiffs’ 
alleged that Lipitor’s manufacturer needed to include specific warnings 
about the risk of type-2 diabetes, citing some 6,000 adverse event 
reports.146  The court determined that adverse event reports that merely 
“describe instances where patients taking Lipitor were diagnosed with 
type 2 diabetes but do not reach any conclusions regarding a causal 
association . . . . cannot constitute ‘newly acquired information’” under a 
“plain reading” of the FDA’s regulations.147   
In finding the claims preempted, the court recognized that the CBE 
requirement that newly acquired information show “a basis to believe 
there is a causal relationship between the drug and the occurrence of the 
adverse event” provides a “backstop to prevent manufacturers from 
 
 142. See, e.g., In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 779 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(finding claim preempted because label change not allowed under CBE regulation absent “newly acquired 
information”). 
 143. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (2019) (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 
2848, 2851 (2008)). 
 144. See Adkins v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. X03HHDCV1606065131S, 2020 WL 
1890681, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020) (“[T]he burden of going forward and identifying the 
purported newly acquired information must fall on the plaintiff because ‘it would be virtually impossible 
for the defendants to prove a negative and negate the existence of newly acquired information without 
knowing exactly what newly acquired information the plaintiff relies upon.’”) (quoting Roberto v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. CPLHHDCV166068484S, 2019 WL 5068452, at *11 n.9 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2019)). 
 145. See Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 87-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 146. See id. at 88. 
 147. Id.  The court additionally rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that adverse event reports which 
“offer no analysis” could be sufficient to shift the burden onto the manufacturer to demonstrate “clear 
evidence” that the FDA would have rejected plaintiffs’ proffered warning change without satisfying the 
first part of the preemption analysis.  Id.  
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warning of every possible adverse reaction in an effort to insulate 
themselves from any conceivable liability.”148  “Over-disclosure,” the 
court cautioned, “dilutes warnings of more significant adverse reactions 
both by likelihood and severity of the reaction and can unjustifiably deter 
patients from a helpful drug or therapy.”149  Consequently, new 
information “without any analysis indicating causality” is inadequate and 
“misses the mark.”150 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York reached a 
similar conclusion shortly after Albrecht was decided in a case involving 
another GBCA branded as Magnevist.151  Here, a plaintiff argued that 
Magnevist, which was approved by the FDA in 1988, required a specific 
warning about gadolinium retention resulting in fibrosis in light of several 
medical studies.152  The court found that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn 
“allegations focus on gadolinium retention, which is not, by itself, [a] 
‘clinically significant adverse reaction,’” were unaccompanied by data 
establishing “the requisite causal connection” to an actual risk of harm.153  
“Studies concluding it ‘remains unknown whether GBCAs induce toxic 
effects’ and that ‘further studies are required to address possible clinical 
consequences of gadolinium deposition,’” the court explained, “do not 
constitute reasonable or well-grounded scientific evidence of ‘clinically 
significant adverse effects’ under the CBE regulation.”154  For instance, 
in dismissing one of the studies proffered by plaintiff as “newly acquired 
information,” the court reasoned that a “single study performed on mice 
does not make a risk ‘apparent’ or otherwise constitute ‘reasonable 
evidence of an association’ between Magnevist and fibrosis.”155  As the 
court appreciated, “to ensure that only ‘scientifically accurate information 
appears in the approved labeling’ the FDA prefers a more cautious 
approach, and finds that because ‘labeling that includes theoretical 
hazards not well-grounded in scientific evidence can cause meaningful 
risk information to lose its significance,’ there must be ‘sufficient 
evidence of a causal association between the drug and the information 
sought to be added.’”156   
 
 148. Id. at 85 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(7)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 88. 
 151. See McGrath v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms. Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 152. See id. at 165.  
 153. Id. at 168. 
 154. Id. at 169-70. 
 155. Id. at 170. 
 156. Id. at 169 (quoting Utts v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 644, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017)) (emphasis in original); see also Klein v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms. Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01424-APG-
EJY, 2019 WL 3945652, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] does not plead facts showing that 
Bayer had or should have had newly acquired information permitting it to unilaterally add her desired 
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If a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of “newly acquired 
information” with the requisite evidence of a causal association to support 
a labeling change under the CBE regulation, the second part of the 
preemption analysis shifts the burden to the branded drug manufacturer 
to show “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the 
proffered labeling change based on that information.157  As discussed, the 
branded manufacturer at this stage should be permitted to rely on the 
information the FDA had at its disposal and the totality of the 
communications between the agency and manufacturer to establish that 
the agency was “fully informed” of justifications supporting a different 
warning to comply with state law.158  A similar pragmatic approach to the 
information exchange should also apply to the FDA’s communications 
that “inform” the branded drug manufacturer that the agency will not 
approve an altered warning.159  Subsequent action to reject a potential 
warning change or continued inaction by the FDA should additionally 
serve as sufficient evidence that the “fully informed” agency has made a 
determination not to alter a warning, which “informed” the manufacturer 
for the purposes of satisfying “clear evidence” under Albrecht.160 
The Court in Albrecht charged judges with making these 
determinations because they are “better suited than are juries to 
understand and to interpret agency decisions” and the import of the FDA’s 
communications that “memorialize its considered judgments.”161  Judges 
are well-suited to discern whether the FDA’s communications with a 
branded drug manufacturer are intended to foreclose further deliberation 
about a potential warning charge (and carry a preemptive effect), or 
accomplish some other objective such as seeking greater information 
about a potential drug risk or continuing a dialogue about potential 
labeling changes.162  Judges should not be limited in their analysis to only 
formal FDA decisions and forced to turn a blind eye to what might be 
repeated, glaring indications by the agency to a manufacturer that a drug’s 
warnings should not be changed.  Such an approach would undermine the 
purpose of having a judge perform a branded drug preemption analysis.   
Judges should also appreciate that a pragmatic approach to deciding 
whether clear evidence exists that the FDA would not approve a warning 
change promotes the development of safer drugs.  It avoids the creation 
 
warning under the CBE regulation.”). 
 157. See Utts, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 661. 
 158. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1678 (2019). 
 159. See supra Part II.A. 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
 161. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1680.  
 162. See, e.g., In re Avandia Mkg., Sales & Prods. Liab. Litig., 945 F.3d 749, 759 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(finding that the FDA’s response letter to a proposed change sought additional information from 
manufacturer such that the agency was not “fully informed” and had not rejected the proposal).  
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of unsound incentives for branded drug manufacturers to pursue 
unnecessary FDA rulings that formally reject every conceivable warning 
change simply to obtain a surefire preemption defense where the agency 
has made its position clear by telling the manufacturer to “hold off” or 
that the science “does not provide a clear path forward” for a labeling 
change.163  This concern becomes more pronounced and antithetical to 
drug safety where a branded drug manufacturer is placed in the position 
of having to use the CBE process to unilaterally implement a warning 
change to protect itself from potentially massive liability exposure, and 
the FDA subsequently reverses that decision.  The result may be needless 
inconsistency in the warnings provided to prescribing physicians that can 
cause confusion, or possibly excessive warnings that dilute more 
significant warnings or cause physicians to disregard other warnings.  The 
FDA, meanwhile, is forced to exhaust its limited resources to respond; 
resources that could otherwise be devoted to evaluating the risks of other 
drugs and advancing drug safety.164 
III. THE ROLE OF PREEMPTION FOR FDA-APPROVED DRUGS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht supplements a legal 
environment in which failure-to-warn claims related to the vast 
majority of U.S. drug prescriptions are preempted under federal law.165  
Congress has established such a regime to further various public policy 
objectives, perhaps most notably the inexpensive development of 
generic drugs that comprise the vast majority of drug prescriptions.166  
Congress has appreciated that having lay juries across fifty states 
“second guess” the labeling cost-benefit analysis of the expert agency 
responsible for ensuring drug safety and efficacy may not necessarily 
improve drug safety.  Nevertheless, with respect to branded drugs that 
are typically newer products, Congress has determined that the value 
of having juries provide a separate means of ensuring drug safety and 
effectiveness is a worthwhile “layer of consumer protection that 
complements FDA regulation.”167  Of course, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, “Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change 
the law and regulations if they so desire.”168 
Doctrines such as the “clear evidence” exception fit within this 
 
 163. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1685-86 (quoting case record).   
 164. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009) (stating that the “FDA has limited resources 
to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market”).  
 165. See supra Part I.A.  
 166. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.   
 167. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.  
 168. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011).   
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framework to remove any second guessing of the FDA’s 
determinations where the agency has made its position known not to 
approve a warning change and has effectively placed the branded drug 
manufacturer in a box.  It follows that the manufacturer that has been 
informed of the FDA’s position not to approve a warning change 
should not be required to engage in a fruitless pursuit to unilaterally 
change a warning only to have the FDA override that change.   
A significant public policy reason for this approach is that the cost 
of developing a branded drug and bringing it to market is already an 
enormously expensive undertaking.  Some studies estimate the 
average research and development investment for a new drug at around 
$1.3 billion, with other studies suggesting total costs closer to $3 
billion.169  These costs reflect the fact that most drug treatments fail to 
obtain FDA approval and represent a sunk cost for the manufacturer.170  
The full research, development and approval process can also take 12 
to 15 years, creating a relatively narrow window for the branded drug 
manufacturer to recoup its investment where drug patents generally 
end after 20 years.171 
Allowing failure-to-warn claims against branded drug 
manufacturers can impose substantial additional costs after a drug 
obtains FDA approval and is marketed for sale.  Every year, branded 
drug manufacturers face thousands of lawsuits related to their 
products.  In 2020, pending product liability MDLs alone involved at 
least twenty different drug products, consolidating tens of thousands 
of cases in federal courts.172  Pharmaceutical product liability is 
estimated to result in billions of dollars of added costs each year.173   
The substantial front-end investments and unpredictable back-end 
liability costs create a challenging environment for new drug 
innovation.  Although competition from generic drug companies can 
 
 169. See Olivier J. Wouters, et al., Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed to 
Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 844 (Mar. 3, 2020), available at 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2762311 (estimating a $1.3 billion mean research 
and development investment to bring a new drug to market and referencing other studies that estimate a 
$2.8 billion expense).  
 170. See id.   
 171. See Leigh Ann Anderson, FDA Drug Approval Process, DRUGS.COM (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.drugs.com/fda-approval-process.html (explaining the 12-to-15-year new drug development 
process).   
 172. See Pending MDLs, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/pending-mdls-0 (providing links to lists of MDLs organized under 
different categories). 
 173. See Erin Bosman et al., $4 Billion Price Tag for Pleasing Plaintiffs’ Bar? New Study Estimates 
Costs of FDA’s Proposed Rule on Generic Drug Labeling, JD SUPRA (Feb. 26, 2014), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/4-billion-price-tag-for-pleasing-plaint-15927/ (discussing analysis 
of proposed rule change to subject generic drug companies to failure-to-warn liability and estimating the 
increased product liability cost at $4 billion annually).  
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prove beneficial in enabling consumers to obtain life-saving 
medications more cheaply, it can also result in an uneven playing field 
where the branded drug company must absorb all product liability 
(even after its drug patent expires) and the generic drug company is 
generally free of that concern.  In addition, the branded drug 
manufacturer bears responsibility and costs related to post-sale 
monitoring of its drug and ensuring the FDA has updated information 
about adverse drug reactions or potential newly discovered drug 
risks.174  Therefore, for a branded drug manufacturer, the availability 
of a preemption defense is critical to mitigating the least predictable 
burdens and costs associated with the development of a drug 
innovation.   
This unpredictability has also increased in recent years.  A few 
courts have expanded state tort law to subject a branded drug 
manufacturer to liability for injury to a person who consumed a generic 
drug manufacturer’s product.  These “innovator liability” theories 
argue that because a branded drug manufacturer (i.e. innovator) 
created the branded version of a drug and obtained FDA approval of 
the warning that generic drug manufacturers are required by law to 
copy, the branded drug manufacturer should be subject to warning 
liability for any harm resulting from a generic version of that drug.175  
In 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court became the first state high 
court to adopt an innovator liability theory, but the decision was short-
lived and effectively overturned by the Alabama Legislature the 
following year.176  Since that time, several other courts have accepted 
innovator liability theories.  For example, in 2017, the California 
Supreme Court held that a branded drug manufacturer may be subject 
to liability where the plaintiff consumed a generic version of the drug, 
even where the branded drug manufacturer had completely divested its 
interests in the branded drug six years before the plaintiff’s injury.177  
In 2018, Massachusetts’ high court similarly embraced innovator 
liability where a branded drug manufacturer acts recklessly with 
respect to its duty to update labeling that a generic drug competitor 
 
 174. See Step 5: FDA Post-Market Drug Safety Monitoring, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-5-fda-post-market-drug-safety-
monitoring#Active_Surveillance (discussing drug manufacturer post-sale monitoring duty).  
 175. See Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name 
Medicines When the Harm was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs has Severe Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1835 (2013).  
 176. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-530(a) (2020) (superseding Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649 
(Ala. 2014), effectively reversing the Alabama Supreme Court’s adoption of the innovator liability 
theory).  
 177. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017). 
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copies.178  
The vast majority of courts, however, have rejected innovator 
liability theories, recognizing they are antithetical to a basic principle 
of product liability that an entity is not liable for injuries caused by a 
competitor’s product.179  For example, in rejecting such a theory, the 
Iowa Supreme Court referred to innovator liability as “Deep pocket 
jurisprudence” that is “law without principle.”180  The court also 
expressed concerns about the potential for subjecting branded drug 
manufacturers to limitless liability, stating it would instead continue to 
adhere to “bedrock principles” and not “contort Iowa’s tort law in 
order to create liability . . . .”181   
Nevertheless, the threat of further judicial adoption of innovator 
liability theories places greater pressure and uncertainty on the branded 
drug manufacturers that develop society’s drug innovations.  The 
critical importance of these innovations, and threats posed by 
excessive liability, are also amplified in times of health crisis, for 
example the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.  Doctrines such as 
the “clear evidence” exception provide an avenue of relief to 
innovating drug manufacturers to at least curb their liability exposure 
where the FDA has indicated the manufacturer has acted responsibly 
with respect to its warning obligation.  A pragmatic approach to 
judicial applications of the “clear evidence” exception following 
Albrecht represents sound public policy because it provides liability 
protection in a fair manner that does not effectively disregard what 
might be years of “extensive communication” and collaboration 
 
 178. See Rafferty v. Merck & Co., Inc., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1219 (Mass. 2018) (“[A] brand-name 
manufacturer that controls the contents of the label on a generic drug owes a duty to consumers of that 
generic drug not to act in reckless disregard of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily injury.”). 
 179. See, e.g., McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 867 (W. Va. 2018) (“[T]here is no 
cause of action in West Virginia for failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation against a brand-name 
drug manufacturer when the drug ingested was produced by a generic drug manufacturer.”), aff’d per 
curiam, 773 F.App’x 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal after remand from West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals); Johnson v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 614-16 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding 
plaintiff’s innovator liability claims against branded drug manufacturer foreclosed under Louisiana 
Products Liability Act (LPLA)); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(“Maryland law requires a plaintiff seeking to recover for an injury by a product to  demonstrate that the 
defendant manufactured the product at issue.”); In Re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
2924, 2020 WL 7866660 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2020) (concluding that “none of the 35 jurisdictions that the 
Court analyzed would recognize Plaintiffs’ theory of liability under which Defendants may be held liable 
for injuries sustained by Plaintiffs’ ingestion of a product that Defendants did not manufacture, sell, or 
distributed”). 
 180. See Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Schwartz et al., supra 
note 175, at 1871); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Iowa High Court Exposes Pharma 
‘Innovator Liability’ for What it Is: Deep-Pocket Jurisprudence, LEGAL OP. LETTERS (Wash. Legal 
Found., D.C.), Sept. 12, 2014, at 1, available at https://www.wlf.org/2014/09/12/publishing/iowa-high-
court-exposes-pharma-innovator-liability-for-what-it-is-deep-pocket-jurisprudence/ (discussing cases). 
 181. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380. 
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between a branded drug manufacturer and the FDA.182   
The availability of preemption for warning claims involving generic 
drugs, vaccines, and branded drugs where the “clear evidence” 
exception is satisfied raises an issue that drives all pharmaceutical 
litigation: how should the law deal with individuals who have suffered 
injury from taking a drug, but may be left uncompensated?  Again, 
failure-to-warn claims related to generic drugs that comprise the vast 
majority of U.S. prescriptions are preempted, meaning that most 
individuals injured by an FDA-approved drug cannot recover from the 
manufacturer.183  This situation is why plaintiffs’ attorneys have 
resorted to asserting innovator liability theories that try to shift blame 
to a branded drug manufacturer that not only did not make the product 
that allegedly caused injury, but is often competing directly with the 
generic drug manufacturer that did.184  If a tortured expansion of 
product liability law offers an unjust and unprincipled way to address 
the problem of uncompensated plaintiffs, what might be a solution?  
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) 
provides an example of a system that strikes a balance between 
promoting the broad use of vaccines and accounting for injuries that 
may result where claims against the drug manufacturer are 
preempted.185  Pursuant to this system, an individual injured by an 
FDA-approved vaccine can file a claim with a no-fault victim 
compensation fund.186  As the Supreme Court has recognized, the 
VICP is “designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil 
tort system” by providing for informal adjudication of injury claims 
and reducing the legal requirements for a claimant to obtain a 
recovery.187 
The VICP, which is funded by an excise tax on each purchased dose 
of a covered vaccine, was adopted precisely because lawsuits against 
vaccine manufacturers and health care providers “threatened to cause 
vaccine shortages and reduce U.S. vaccination rates, which could have 
caused a resurgence of vaccine preventable diseases.”188  By generally 
preempting all design and warning claims and channeling injury 
 
 182. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1684-86 (2019) (Alito, J., 
concurring).  
 183. See STATISTA.COM, supra note 23.  
 184. See Schwartz et al., supra note 175. 
 185. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 
https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html (last updated Nov. 2020) (outlining vaccine 
injury compensation program).  
 186. See id.  
 187. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 228 (2011) (quoting Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 
U.S. 268, 269 (1995)).  
 188. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 185. 
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claims into a no fault compensation system, the VICP has played a 
vital role in stabilizing the production and broad use of vaccines.189 
 A similar approach might provide a balanced solution with respect 
to the development of drugs other than vaccines.  Such an approach 
would require legislation, and would surely involve greater scope and 
complexity, but would get to the heart of the compensation issue.  It 
could do so without undermining the benefits federal law provides 
through preemption; benefits that include having an expert federal 
agency set forth labeling requirements in a manner uninhibited by 
potentially inconsistent lay jury determinations, promoting the 
continued development of inexpensive generic drugs, and advancing 
drug innovations through more predictable costs and liability 
exposure.   
Although the specifics of a compensation fund model are beyond 
the scope of this Article, policymakers searching for an optimal 
balance of competing public policies may find value in it.  Judges 
tasked with preemption determinations, on the other hand, must apply 
the law as it exists and leave any future regime change to Congress.  
With respect to the “clear evidence” exception, the Supreme Court has 
articulated an approach for judges that fairly balances the competing 
policy interests under the current liability system.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht resolved several important 
outstanding issues regarding the application of the “clear evidence” 
exception, but also left open precisely what evidence will suffice to show 
that the FDA would not have approved a labeling change to a branded 
drug.  The Court held that such determinations must be made by judges, 
not juries, and provided guidance to judges on how to conduct a modern 
branded drug preemption analysis.  This analysis focuses on the exchange 
of information between the FDA and the branded drug manufacturer to 
assess whether the manufacturer “fully informed” the agency of the 
justifications for a warning change and whether the FDA “informed” the 
manufacturer that the agency would not approve a warning change.  
Judges applying this standard should adopt a pragmatic and flexible 
approach that looks at the totality of the FDA’s communications, action 
or inaction to determine whether the agency has made its position clear, 
and avoid any rigid approach that considers only formal agency rulings.  
An overly narrow approach would ignore circumstances in which the 
 
 189. See Emily Levine & Andrea Davey, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and 
Maternal Immunizations, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 32, 39 (2017) (“Very few cases have been filed 
and pursued against vaccine manufacturers or administrators in post-VICP civil litigation.”).  
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FDA has made plain its position not to change a drug’s labeling, and 
invite adverse consequences that can impair physicians’ ability to 
properly prescribe drug treatments and impede safety improvements.  A 
pragmatic approach also strikes a fairer balance in reducing unpredictable 
liability costs for branded drug manufacturers that can hinder new drug 
innovations.  Albrecht provides judges with a sound path forward for 
making reasonable preemption determinations and is up to them to 
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